OLIGOPOLY, UNCERTAIN DEMAND, AND FORWARD MARKETS

被引：8

作者：

ELDOR, R ^{[1
]}

ZILCHA, I ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TEL AVIV UNIV,DEPT ECON,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS | 1990年 / 42卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0148-6195(90)90017-7

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium behavior of risk-averse oligopolistic firms under uncertain demand. It is shown that in the presence of unbiased forward markets the Nash Equilibrium (NE) output increases, that is, forward markets enhance copetition. Unlike the competitive or monopoly cases, here the introduction of an unbiased forward market may result in a (unique) NE in which all the firms are worse off. © 1990.

引用

页码：17 / 26

页数：10

共 17 条

[1]

ANDERSON RW, 1986, CSFM141 COL BUS SCH

[2] OPTIMAL INTERNATIONAL HEDGING IN COMMODITY AND CURRENCY FORWARD MARKETS [J].