INFORMED SPECULATION WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION

被引：363

作者：

KYLE, AS

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1989年 / 56卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297551

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：317 / 356

页数：40

共 16 条

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