DOES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AFFECT ECONOMIC-POLICY CHOICES - EVIDENCE FROM GUBERNATORIAL TERM LIMITS

被引:498
作者
BESLEY, T
CASE, A
机构
[1] PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08544
[2] NBER,CAMBRIDGE,MA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2946699
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.
引用
收藏
页码:769 / 798
页数:30
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]   POLITICAL CYCLES IN OECD ECONOMIES [J].
ALESINA, A ;
ROUBINI, N .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (04) :663-688
[2]  
[Anonymous], CURR POP SURV
[3]  
[Anonymous], STAT ABSTR US
[4]  
AUSTENSMITH D, 1989, P ORDESHOOK MODELS S
[5]  
BANKS J, 1993, LONG LIVED PRINCIPAL
[6]  
BARRO R, 1970, PUBLIC CHOICE, V14, P19
[7]   DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC DEBT [J].
BARRO, RJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) :940-971
[8]  
BESLEY T, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P25
[9]  
BROWNING EK, 1987, AM ECON REV, V77, P11
[10]  
*CHAMB COMM US, AN WORK COMP LAWS