RES AND DEV INVESTMENT IN A SYMMETRICAL AND HOMOGENEOUS OLIGOPOLY - BERTRAND VS COURNOT

被引：53

作者：

DELBONO, F ^{[1
]}

DENICOLO, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV BOLOGNA,DEPT ECON,I-40126 BOLOGNA,ITALY

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1990年 / 8卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(90)90022-S

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we compare the equilibrium R & D investment under Bertrand and Cournot competition in a symmetric and homogeneous oligopoly. It is shown that, although the R&D investment is greater under Bertrand competition, social welfare, net of R & D costs, may be greater under Cournot competition. This conflict between static and dynamic efficiency arises because too many resources may be invested in R & D when there is price competition in the product market. © 1990.

引用

页码：297 / 313

页数：17

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