ASYMPTOTIC EFFICIENCY IN PRINCIPAL AGENT MODELS WITH HIDDEN INFORMATION

被引：2

作者：

LOCKWOOD, B ^{[1
]}

THOMAS, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV WARWICK,COVENTRY CV4 7AL,W MIDLANDS,ENGLAND

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(89)90081-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：297 / 301

页数：5

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[3]

LOCKWOOD B, 1986, THESIS U WARWICK COV

[4]

LOCKWOOD B, 1984, STRUCTURE LONG TERM

[5] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J].

RADNER, R .

RADNER, R .

[7]

Roberts A. W., 1973, CONVEX FUNCTIONS

[8] REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD [J].

RUBINSTEIN, A ;

YAARI, ME .

[9] ON REPEATED MORAL HAZARD WITH DISCOUNTING [J].

SPEAR, SE ;

SRIVASTAVA, S .

[10]

THOMAS J, 1985, INCOME FLUCTUATION A