PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION IN 2-PERSON SEALED-BID DOUBLE AUCTIONS

被引：79

作者：

MATTHEWS, SA ^{[1
]}

POSTLEWAITE, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1989年 / 48卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90126-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：238 / 263

页数：26

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