EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION AND EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE PROBLEMS - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS

被引：145

作者：

LEWELLEN, W ^{[1
]}

LODERER, C ^{[1
]}

MARTIN, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CHICAGO,CHICAGO,IL 60637

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 9卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(87)90009-7

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：287 / 310

页数：24

共 38 条

[1]

AGRAWAL A, 1985, UNPUB MANAGERIAL INC

[2] RISK REDUCTION AS A MANAGERIAL MOTIVE FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS [J].

AMIHUD, Y ;

LEV, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02) :605-617

[3]

ANTLE R, 1984, EMPIRICAL INVESTIGAT

[4]

BENELLI G, 1986, IN PRESS J BUSINESS

[5] PRICING OF OPTIONS AND CORPORATE LIABILITIES [J].

BLACK, F ;

SCHOLES, M .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1973, 81 (03) :637-654

[6] MANAGERIALISM AND RISK-RETURN PERFORMANCE [J].

BOUDREAUX, KJ .

SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1973, 39 (03) :366-372

[7] THE IMPACT OF LONG-RANGE MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION PLANS ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH [J].

BRICKLEY, JA ;

BHAGAT, S ;

LEASE, RC .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1985, 7 (1-3) :115-129

[8] EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, MANAGEMENT TURNOVER, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION [J].

COUGHLAN, AT ;

SCHMIDT, RM .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1985, 7 (1-3) :43-66

[9]

Fama E. F., 1972, THEORY FINANCE

[10] AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J].

FAMA, EF .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) :288-307

← 1 2 3 4 →