OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AMONG GROUPS

被引：38

作者：

CORCHON, LC

机构：

[1] Universidad de Alicante, San Vicente del Raspeig, Alicante

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 36卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90045-M

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can create as many firms as they like. It is shown by means of two examples that under constant returns to scale, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria implies perfect competition. © 1991.

引用

页码：1 / 3

页数：3