WHY FIRMS VOLUNTARILY DISCLOSE BAD-NEWS

被引:1155
作者
SKINNER, DJ
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2491386
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:38 / 60
页数:23
相关论文
共 34 条
[1]   CORPORATE MANAGERS EARNINGS FORECASTS AND SYMMETRICAL ADJUSTMENTS OF MARKET EXPECTATIONS [J].
AJINKYA, BB ;
GIFT, MJ .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1984, 22 (02) :425-444
[2]   DO THE MERITS MATTER - A STUDY OF SETTLEMENTS IN SECURITIES CLASS-ACTIONS [J].
ALEXANDER, JC .
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1991, 43 (03) :497-598
[3]   FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE POLICY IN AN ENTRY GAME [J].
DARROUGH, MN ;
STOUGHTON, NM .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1990, 12 (1-3) :219-243
[4]   ACCOUNTING CHOICE IN TROUBLED COMPANIES [J].
DEANGELO, H ;
DEANGELO, L ;
SKINNER, DJ .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1994, 17 (1-2) :113-143
[5]  
DONTOH A, 1989, J ACCOUNTING AUDITIN, V4, P480
[6]   DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATION [J].
DYE, RA .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1985, 23 (01) :123-145
[7]  
Elliot J., 1988, J ACCOUNTING RES S, V26, P91, DOI DOI 10.2307/2491182
[8]  
FRANCIS J, 1993, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATI
[9]  
GIGLER FB, 1992, SELF ENFORCING PUBLI
[10]   THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF WARRANTIES AND PRIVATE DISCLOSURE ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY [J].
GROSSMAN, SJ .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1981, 24 (03) :461-483