THE INTERACTION OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT CONTRACTS

被引：80

作者：

SCHMIDT, KM

SCHNITZER, M

机构：

[1] Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn, Bonn, D-53113

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1995年 / 48卷 / 02期

关键词：

IMPLICIT CONTRACTS; REPEATED GAMES;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(94)00601-W

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze explicit and implicit contracts in a repeated principal-agent model with observable but only partially contractable actions of the agent. It is shown that the set of implementable actions may increase or decrease if additional actions become contractable.

引用

页码：193 / 199

页数：7

共 6 条

[1] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J].