ENDOGENOUS AVAILABILITY, CARTELS, AND MERGER IN AN EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION

被引:39
作者
MCAFEE, RP
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1994.1002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a generalization of the Butters advertising model, the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others, who all advertise equally. A cartel formation game is considered, and any equilibrium cartel involves at least two, but generally not all, firms. In one equilibrium, only the largest firms join the cartel. A merger game is considered. and, in equilibrium, the large film buys the other films in sequence, with discounting equalizing the expected utility of the targets and prices rising over time. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:24 / 47
页数:24
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