COMMITMENT AND OBSERVABILITY IN GAMES

被引：145

作者：

BAGWELL, K

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 8卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80001-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Models of commitment make two assumptions: there is a first mover, and his action is perfectly observed by the subsequent mover. The purpose of this apper is to disentangle these two assumptions, in order to see if a strategic benefit from commitment remains when the first mover's choice is imperfectly observed. The basic finding is that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first mover's selection. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：271 / 280

页数：10

共 13 条

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[3]

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