WHY CAPITAL HIRES LABOR - A BARGAINING PERSPECTIVE

被引:10
作者
DOW, GK
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F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Organizational forms often serve as vehicles for the appropriation of quasi-rent. Capitalist firms typically emerge when production requires noncontractible investments in specific physical assets, because worker control would divert quasi-rents away from asset owners ex post. Conversely, labor-managed firms tend to emerge in niches requiring specialized human capital but general-purpose physical assets. A key result is that capitalist firms can persist in competitive markets even when labor-managed firms would yield a larger total surplus.(JEL C78, D23, J54, P13)
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页码:118 / 134
页数:17
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