CREATING EXPECTATIONAL ASSETS IN THE LABORATORY - COORDINATION IN WEAKEST-LINK GAMES

被引：106

作者：

KNEZ, M ^{[1
]}

CAMERER, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CALTECH,DIV SOCIAL SCI,PASADENA,CA

来源：

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1994年 / 15卷

关键词：

COORDINATION; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; RESOURCE-BASED VIEW; GROUP NORMS;

D O I：

10.1002/smj.4250150908

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. 'Weakest-link' games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players' beliefs about what the minimum will be are an 'expectational asset' (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization-level behavior and the resource-based view of the firm.

引用

页码：101 / 119

页数：19

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