STOCK-PRICE RESPONSE TO ACCOUNTING INFORMATION IN OLIGOPOLY

被引：11

作者：

JOH, GH ^{[1
]}

LEE, CWJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TULANE UNIV,NEW ORLEANS,LA 70118

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS | 1992年 / 65卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/296579

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this article, we explore the linkage between the Ball-Brown effect and the information transfer effect in oligopoly. Using the data from the Wall Street Journal's "Digest of Earnings Report" column, we analyze how the stock market reacts to the subearnings information. We show that an unexpected increase in sales is good news to the disclosing firm as well as to its competitors. However, an unexpected increase in costs is bad news to the disclosing firm but good news to its competitors. The Ball-Brown effect can be viewed as a consequence of stock market reactions to subearnings disclosure.

引用

页码：451 / 472

页数：22

共 22 条

[1]

ANDERSEN A, 1976, MANAGEMENT GUIDE BET

[2]

[Anonymous], 1986, FINANCIAL STATEMENT

[3] INTRAINDUSTRY INFORMATION TRANSFERS ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT FORECASTS OF EARNINGS [J].