REPRESENTATIVE VERSUS DIRECT DEMOCRACY - ARE THERE ANY EXPENDITURE DIFFERENCES

被引:31
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SANTERRE, RE
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10.1007/BF00149242
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F [经济];
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02 ;
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页码:145 / 154
页数:10
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